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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
this principle when applied to a proceeding relating to the custody
of children. He declared that the contract entered into by the
parents in Virginia should not preclude the South Carolina courts
from determining the question of custody. He maintained that
the contractual rights of the parents should be subordinated to
the welfare of the children.
There is much that can be said for Justice Oxner's dissent, not
only on the proposition that an agreed order of dismissal should
not bar a subsequent suit on the same cause of action by the same
parties but that any custody decree by a foreign court should be
subject to inquiry by a court of competent jurisdiction. The pri-
mary principle in this field should be the discretion of the court
as exclusively governed by the child's welfare.
On the other hand, there are arguments that support the propo-
sition that custody decrees should be subject to the full faith and
credit clause. If parental "child snatching" and constant litigation
for the possession of a child are the results of nonrecognition of
foreign custody decrees, the best interests of the child are defeated.
One writer has proposed a "clean hands" approach to the prob-
lem. This theory suggests that only if the party seeking to relitigate
the question of the child's custody comes before the court in good
faith without fault with respect to the child, should such relitiga-
tion be allowed. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody
Decrees, 51 MicH. L. REv. 345 (1953).
Whatever the best view, the welfare of the child cannot be
promoted if its custody is controlled by uncertain rules as to
constitutional questions and is so easily subject to change under
them.
Forest Jackson Bowman
Criminal Law-Shoplifting-Lack of Requirement of Intent
Does Not Invalidate Statute
D was found guilty of a misdemeanor offense under the North
Carolina shoplifting statute. On appeal, D moved that the war-
rant be quashed on the ground that the statute does not require
any felonious intent, and is therefore unconstitutional. The court
allowed this motion to quash. Held, reversed. The shoplifting
statute is not violative of state or federal constitutions although
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it does not require any felonious intent. State v. Hales, 122 S.E.2d
768 (N.C. 1961).
In the area of effective social control of shoplifting, the need
for statutory alteration of the common law rule has become in-
creasingly apparent in recent years. In response to such need,
many states have enacted shoplifting statutes. The common law
rules, developed at a time when the modem merchandising meth-
ods were unknown, are ill-adapted to current needs. Since felonious
intent is a necessary element of larceny, an honest merchant, if
he fails to secure a conviction of the accused, subjects himself to
liability for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecu-
tion. As a consequence, many merchants helplessly stood by ob-
serving a wrong, fearful of being prosecuted themselves lest their
convictions be correct. See Comment, 63 W. VA. L. REv. 196
(1961). One conservative estimate has placed the yearly loss due
to shoplifting in excess of 100,000,000 dollars. Wall Street journal,
Oct. 31, 1956, p. 1, col. 4. The North Carolina statute, similar to
West Virginia's statute, merits consideration.
The North Carolina statute provides:
'Whoever, without authority, wilfully conceals the goods or
merchandise of any store, not theretofore purchased by such
person, while still upon the premises of such store, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. . . . Such goods or merchandise
found concealed shall be prima facie evidence of a wilful
concealment' N.C. Gen. Stat. S 14-72.1 (Supp. 1961).
The defendant attacked this statute on three grounds: (1) it does
not inform the defendant, with reasonable precision, of the act it
prohibits; (2) the statute is so general and indefinite that it is
void for uncertainty; and (3) it is unconstitutional because it does
not require any felonious intent.
It is a general rule of law that the forbidden conduct need not
be described with mathematical precision or absolute certainty.
Reasonable certainty is sufficient. 1 WmARTON, ClmvMNAL LAW &
PRomnuRE § 18 (1957). However, a criminal statute must be
sufficiently definite so as to inform the citizen with reasonable
precision what acts it intends to prohibit. It is not unfair to re-
quire that one who goes perilously close to an area of prescribed
conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line. Boyce
Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952). The statute
in the principal case appears to be in conformity with the above
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rule, since all essential provisions are present which state what the
prohibited act is, and it informs a person of ordinary intelligence
as to what course of conduct he may safely pursue.
The third defense raises two vital questions. May the legisla-
ture constitutionally declare an act criminal and thereby create
a new statutory crime irrespective of the intent of the doer of the
act? May the legislature constitutionally declare that goods or
merchandise concealed upon or about a person, not theretofore
purchased by such person, shall be prima facie evidence of a
wilful concealment? In answering the first question in the affir-
mative, the court in the principal case stated that the legislature
has the inherent power to define and punish any act as a crime,
because it is undisputedly a part of the police power of the state.
This power is, however, subject to the limitations imposed by the
fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. In order to avoid a
conflict with the fourteenth admendment, a statute which elimin-
ates intent as a necessary element must be scrutinized in view of
its manifest purpose and design. State v. Correll, 232 N.C. 696, 62
S.E.2d 82 (1950); Hunter v. Tennessee, 158 Tenn. 63, 12 S.W.2d
361 (1928). Another requisite for validity is that an act of the
legislature declaring what shall constitute a crime must have some
substantial relation to the ends sought to be accomplished. People
v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934); 1 WiLARToN, CmM-
iNAL LAw & PRocEDuBE § 16 (1957). In Shevlin-Carpenter Co.
v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910), the Court stated that legislation
eliminating intent as an essential element of a statutory crime is
sustained on grounds of necessity, and is not violative of federal
or other constitutional prohibitions. The manifest purpose and
design of the shoplifting statute is to provide an effective remedy
against shoplifting for the merchant, thereby providing him with
adequate protection. With this objective in mind, the legislature
purposely eliminated intent as a necessary element of the crime,
for this is the stumbling block inherent in common law larceny.
Therefore, it necessarily follows that the creation of this crime does
bear a substantial relationship to the end sought to be accomplished,
and due process is not thereby violated.
The second question presented, whether the legislature can
declare that the fact that goods are concealed is prima facie evidence
of a wilful concealment, is more vexatious. The legislature is at-
tempting to create a presumption which would assist the state in
securing a conviction and in limiting the amount of evidence it
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must produce to do so. Where, in the opinion of the court or
legislature, the existence of the basic fact makes socially desirable
the legal results which will follow if the presumed fact also exists,
the accomplishment of the desired end may be facilitated by the
creation of a presumption. Note, 61 W. VA. L. REv. 209, 212 (1959).
However, there must be a guide as to what or how much may be
presumed from the existence of certain facts. Such a guide was
set forth in Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928). The legis-
lature has the power to enact provisions wherein when certain
facts have been proved, they shall be prima facie evidence of the
main fact in question, if the fact proved has some fair relation to,
or natural connection with, the main fact. A second guide is that
the presumption must be connected with the main fact proved in
common experience. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1933).
What is a "fair relation to"' or "connected in common experience,"
may be gleaned from cases dealing with the use of presumptions.
In Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1921), the statutory offense
was that of knowingly permitting a still upon the defendant's
premises. The statute provided that when distilling apparatus
was found on the premises, this should be prima facie evidence
that the person in actual possession had knowledge of its exist-
ence. The defendant's premises were a farm upon which the still
was found. The Court held that this presumption was valid because
the existence of the basic fact proved (presence of the still) is
connected in common experience with the presumed fact (knowl-
edge of its existence). It is to be noted that no intent to use the
still was necessary for a conviction under this statute. However,
a statutory presumption was declared invalid in Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1942). The defendant was convicted under
§ 2 (f) of the Federal Firearms Act, which Act contained the
following presumption: From a prisoner's prior conviction of a
crime of violence and his present possession of a firearm, it shall
be presumed that such firearm was received by him in interstate
commerce. The Court, although stating that Congress has the
power to prescribe what evidence is to be received in the courts
of the United States, held that proof of one fact is not evidence
of the existence of the presumed fact. In so holding, the Court
realized that in common experience there is no rational connection
between the basic fact and the presumed fact.
Although there has been no prior litigation testing the validity
of a shoplifting statute, it appears that the court reached the
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proper conclusion in the instant case. Common experience dic-
tates that one who conceals goods which he has not purchased
almost inevitably is doing so wilfully, and with the intent of
pilfering the item. This case seemingly falls within the category
of Hawes v. Georgia, supra. Even though the principal case ap-
pears to contravene the maxim "it is better to allow ten guilty men
to go free than to convict one innocent man," our modem merchan-
dising methods and rapid pace of living necessitate the creation
of a shoplifting statute.
Is the law governing the principal case applicable to the West
Virginia shoplifting statute? This statute provides:
"If any person shall wilfully conceal upon his person or other-
wise merchandise belonging to any store and for which such
person has not paid the purchase price in full, either upon or
away from the store premises, there shall be a prima facie pre-
sumption that such person has concealed said merchandise
with the intent of converting the same to his own use . ... "
(italics supplied). W. VA. CoDE ch. 61, art. 3A, § 3 (Michie
1961).
Our statute differs from the North Carolina statute in four respects:
(1) the person may be away from the premises; (2) intent is a
necessary element, although it may be presumed if all other requisite
elements are proved; (3) the felony stage is attained if the value
of the article taken exceeds fifty dollars; (4) shoplifting is a breach
of the peace. Differences (3) and (4) are found in § § 2 and 4 of
the code.
The West Virginia Legislature did not deem it expedient to
eliminate intent from the statute, as the North Carolina Legisla-
ture did. Instead the West Virginia statute creates a presumption
that the actor intended to convert the goods to his own use if
the other stated requisites are shown. It therefore appears that
the statute does little more than codify common law larceny.
However, two advantages inure from the statute. It limits the
amount of evidence which the state must produce in order to state
a prima facie case, and the accused must show intent was lacking
as a matter of law before he is entitled to a directed verdict.
In a criminal case, the state bears the burden of proving the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Stull, 110
W. Va. 576, 158 S.E. 905 (1931). The state must, therefore, prove
all of the required elements which constitute the crime beyond a
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reasonable doubt. The statutory presumption relieves the state
of producing evidence which would prove the felonious intent of
the accused. The court stated in State v. Dodds, 54 W. Va. 289,
46 S.E. 228 (1903), that a presumption is a rule of law that courts
or juries may draw a particular inference from a particular fact or
from particular evidence, unless and until the truth of such pre-
sumption is disproved. The burden of going forward with the
evidence shifts from the state to the accused. State v. Dodds,
supra. However, the burden of proof and the burden of per-
suasion do not shift, but remain upon the state. When the basic
facts are established by the evidence, the defendant may destroy
the presumption by either disproving the basic fact itself, or by
producing sufficient evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed
fact. NASH, ThE LAw OF EvmECE, VmGI-IA AND WEST VIRG A
§ 209 (1954). If the defendant does not rebut the presumption,
and there is evidence that the basic fact exists, the party in whose
favor the presumption operates is entitled to have the jury in-
structed that they must find the presumed fact if they find the
basic fact exists. NASH, TE LAw oF EVIDENCE, supra at § 215.
These, then, are the effects of the presumption. An application
of the above rules to the West Virginia shoplifting statute may
best be accomplished through hypothetical situations. First, assume
that X has a bulge in his pocket which Y, the store manager,
thinks may conceal merchandise. Y stops X and finds unwrapped
goods. X is beyond the check-out counter and is progressing toward
the exit. X's excuse is that he "forgot' to pay. Upon these facts,
X is attempting to rebut the presumption by his defense of "for-
getting" to pay. The state need offer no contrary evidence, the
case goes to the jury, and the decision rests with it as to whether
X has successfully shown lack of intent. In this situation, the jury
might well find X's explanation untenable and inadequate to rebut
the presumption. If X's defense is that he bought this article else-
where, in the absence of any corroborating testimony, the determin-
ation rests with the jury. If corraborated, X may be entitled to a
directed verdict if the judge feels as a matter of law that a basic
fact has not been proved, and therefore, the presumption of in-
tent, which rests upon proof of the basic facts, cannot arise. With-
out the requisite intent, the state's case must fail.
Second, assume the same as above, except that X is stopped be-
fore he reaches the check-out counter. If X's defense is that he
was unable to hold all of the items in his hand, and thus placed
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some in his pocket, the jury again must decide if this explanation
is plausible enough, under the circumstances, to rebut the pre-
sumption. An important element shedding light upon X's intent
is the manner in which he concealed the merchandise. If he placed
the goods in his pocket or in the bottom of a shopping bag, this
would seem to indicate that the requisite intent to shoplift was
present. If he placed the goods in a more revealing position, the
jury might well find that his explanation dissolves the presump-
tion of intent. Thus, the controlling elements appear to be the
manner in which the goods are concealed and at what location in
the store the accused is accosted.
While the West Virginia statute aids the state in its prosecution
by employing a presumption of intent, the North Carolina statute
seems to be the better of the two, in that it eliminates the intent
element altogether. Viewing the ultimate goal to be attained, that
of affording the merchant a practical remedy for his protection,
the North Carolina statute more nearly satisfies this need. Al-
though some injustice may result in North Carolina because one
with a plausible explanation may still be found guilty, an equal
injustice may result in West Virginia. Where one who is guilty
is acquitted because the jury felt that the accused had successfully
rebutted the presumption of intent, he may then bring an action
against the merchant for false arrest, false imprisonment, or mali-
cious prosecution. The law must treat all citizens equally, and the
housewife who picks up a fifty cent item is equally as guilty as a
professional shoplifter who takes hundreds of dollars worth of
merchandise. Our shoplifting statute is a step forward toward
modernizing the law to keep pace with the modernized world of
today.
David Mayer Katz
Labor Law-J-urisdiction of NLRB-Dolar Yardsticks of
NLRB and the "Affecting Commerce" Test
The National Labor Relations Board assumed jurisdiction of a
labor dispute where the evidence showed that Employer, a New
York corporation, sold within the state more than 500,000 dollars
worth of fuel oil products purchased in the state from a refinery
engaged in interstate commerce. The Board found Employer had
engaged in unfair labor practices and petitioned the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement of an appropriate cease
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